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Abstract
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates the findings of work in progress to encourage the exchange of ideas about development 
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names of the authors and should be cited accordingly. The findings, interpretations, and conclusions expressed in this paper are entirely those 
of the authors. They do not necessarily represent the views of the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development/World Bank and 
its affiliated organizations, or those of the Executive Directors of the World Bank or the governments they represent.
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This paper assesses the impact of work-related migration 
by males on the labor market behavior of females in 
Nepal. Using data from the 2004 Nepal household 
survey, the authors apply the Instrumental Variable Full 
Information Maximum Likelihood method to account 
for unobserved factors that could simultaneously affect 
males’ decision to migrate and females’ decision to 
participate in the labor market. The results indicate 
that male migration for work has a negative impact 
on the level of market work participation by the 
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women left behind. The authors find evidence of 
substantial heterogeneity (based both on observable 
and unobservable characteristics) in the impact of male 
migration. The findings highlight the important gender 
dimension of the impact of predominantly male worker 
migration on the wellbeing of sending households. The 
authors argue that strategies for economic development 
in Nepal should take into account such gender aspects of 
the migration dynamics.
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1. Introduction 
 
A sharp increase in the number of work migrants and in the amount of remittances they 
send to their countries of origin has fueled the recent debate on the costs and benefits of 
international migration for the sending communities (United Nations 2002). Remittances 
are considered to be one of the main factors through which migration affects economic 
growth. Most microeconomic studies of migration and remittances focus on their role in 
reducing poverty and economic inequality. At the same time, the impact of remittances 
and migration on the economic behavior of household members ‘left behind’ has received 
relatively little attention among economists (Kanaiaupuni 2000). 
 Most research on this issue comes from sociological and demographic literature 
which indicates that the time women spend working on home farms is increasing, due, at 
least in part, to the migration of males (Deere and Leon 1987, Crummet 1987). Among 
the few economists that focus on the labor market outcomes of members of households 
that have sent migrants, Itzigsohn (1995) assesses the effect of migrant remittances on 
income and labor market participation of members of low-income urban households in 
the Caribbean Basin. Rodriguez and Tiongson (2001) analyze the effect migrants have on 
the labor force participation of non-migrants in the Philippines. Sadiqi and Ennaji (2004) 
study the impact of male migration from Morocco to Europe on the women left behind. 
Amuedo-Dorantes and Pozo (2006) investigate how migration and migrant remittances 
affect the employment status and hours of work of individuals living in the sending 
households in Mexico. The relation between remittances, labor supply, and school 
attendance in El Salvador is examined by Acosta (2006). Cabegin (2006) examines the 
effect of overseas work-related migration on the market participation and labor supply 
behavior of migrants’ spouses left behind in the Philippines. Kim (2007) studies the 
impact of remittances on labor supply in Jamaica. The common finding of all these 
studies is that migration and remittances result in a decline in the labor force participation 
of household members left behind, in particular, of females. 
 The objective of this paper is to examine the extent to which male migration 
affects the labor force participation of prime age women in Nepal. This question is of  
 2
interest for a country where one out of every ten prime age males is currently working 
overseas and remittances reached 17 percent of GDP in 2004 (World Bank 2005).  
Work migration in Nepal, while predominantly a male phenomenon, takes place 
within a social framework. It affects families, households and communities, brings 
changes in the gender division of labor and increases the women’s workload. Male work 
migrants are gone for months and sometimes for years at a time, leaving women to 
assume the day-to-day productive responsibilities at home. When their husbands migrate, 
wives not only continue to rear the children and take care of the usual household chores, 
but often also fill in for the absent husbands in working on the family plots or enterprises. 
Female heads of agricultural households have a particularly hard time when male labor is 
not available for such tasks as plowing which is taboo for women in certain areas of 
Nepal (Nandini 1999).  
Another effect of male worker migration is that the well-being of sending 
households becomes increasingly dependent on women raising their status and 
strengthening their position in household decision-making. Women can find themselves 
playing key roles as entrepreneurs in investing or divesting remittance incomes or 
running bazaar economies based on the sale of remittances in kind (Brown and Connell 
1993). At the same time, social and traditional family norms, as well as the structure of 
the Nepali labor market which has limited employment opportunities for women, 
reinforce husbands’ objections to wives working away from home. With their husbands 
absent, wives find it easier to work at home in order to maintain respectability in the eyes 
of neighbors and relatives. 
A husband’s migration can have a mixed effect on gender relations between his 
wife and other members of the sending household. If a man leaves his wife in an 
extended household and sends remittances to his parents, the mother and father-in-law 
dominate family affairs. Several sociological studies have shown (e.g., Sharma 1986) that 
the role of the daughter-in-law in Nepal requires subservient behavior and the 
performance of arduous tasks. The absence of a husband may represent the loss of a 
possible ally for his wife, someone to speak on her behalf should her in-laws mistreat her 
or become too demanding. On the other hand, depending on circumstances and on 
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whether the husband sends his remittances to his parents or his wife, the reverse can also 
occur. 
A 28-year old woman from Shyauli Bazaar in Gorkha district looks after her 
household and farm. Her husband is working in Dubai and sends his earnings to her. 
Though she lives in an extended family with her two children, grandmother, and father 
and mother-in-law, these days she is also the acting head of her household. Her 
grandmother and mother-in-law are not well, so she has taken charge of all household 
and farm responsibilities. Her father-in-law helps with the household chores but leaves 
most of the decision-making to her. Though her family and productive demands are 
many, she has become involved in community groups and is the treasurer of one savings 
and credit program (World Bank 2006). 
In this paper, we develop a theoretical model in which a household decides to 
send a male migrant to work and whether the female participates in market activities. 
This model motivates our empirical strategy. Using data from the 2004 nationally 
representative survey of Nepali households, we applied the Full Information Maximum 
Likelihood method to estimate the effect of migration of men on market work 
participation (MWP) by the women left behind. The method took into account 
unobserved household characteristics that could simultaneously affect migration and 
MWP decisions. Our results indicate that male migration has a negative impact on the 
level of MWP by the women left behind. 
The current paper contributes to the existing literature on the effects of migration 
and remittances in three important ways. First, to the best of our knowledge, this analysis 
is the first attempt to estimate the impact of remittances and migration on the labor 
market behavior of household members of sending households in Nepal. Second, in this 
literature, we used a new methodology—an econometric technique that controls for 
various forms of endogeneity and selection biases arising in our model. Finally, our 
results highlight the important gender dimension of the predominantly male worker 
migration on the well-being of sending households. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes data and defines 
the main constructed variables, Section 3 presents the descriptive results, and Section 4 
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discusses the theoretical model and the estimation methodology. Our main findings are 
presented in Section 5. Section 6 concludes. 
 
2. Data 
 
The analysis in this paper is based on the data from the 2004 Round of the Nepal Living 
Standard Survey (NLSS-II). The NLSS is a nationally-representative survey of 
households and communities. NLSS-II was conducted between April 2003 and April 
2004 by the Nepal Central Bureau of Statistics with assistance from the World Bank. The 
sample frame of NLSS-II was designed using a two-stage method based on the 2001 
Census1. For our analysis, we selected a sub-sample of 3,528 households with prime-age 
females, and our sample contains information on 5,426 females 18 to 60 years of age. We 
used data from the First (1996) Round of NLSS and the Nepal Census of 2001 for 
descriptive results and to construct the lagged indicators at ward and district levels.  
The NLSS collects data on household consumption of a wide range of food and 
non-food items, detailed information about the socio-demographic composition of the 
interviewed households, labor status of the household members, members’ health and 
educational achievements, and information on various sources of household income 
including income in-kind and individual wages. In a special section of the questionnaire, 
respondents reported the amounts of remittance their households received during the 
month of the survey, and provided information on the age and destination of the 
migration of the donors. This information was used to identify households with 
migrants2. Our analysis focuses on the labor market behavior of women 18 to 60 years of 
age. We define a woman to be participating in the labor market if she is involved in 
wage-earning activities. 
 
                                                 
1 For detailed description of sample frame and survey methodology, see World Bank 2005 (this citation is 
missing in the References section at the end). 
2 Lokshin, Bonch-Osmolovskiy and Glinskaya (2007) discuss the possible biases from misclassification of 
households receiving remittances and households with migrants; they show that for Nepal these biases are 
relatively small.  
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3. Migration and Female Labor Force Participation in Nepal  
 
Work-related migration has become a major factor affecting the economic development 
of Nepal during the last two decades. In 2004, close to a million Nepali migrants were 
working in India, countries of the Arab Gulf, South Asia, Western Europe, and North 
America. According to official sources, the amount of remittances received by Nepali 
households from abroad reached $1 billion, overflowing foreign exchange reserves and 
affecting the exchange rate and inflation. The amount of remittances coming through 
unofficial channels could be at least as large. 
Thirty-two percent of households in Nepal had working migrants and received 
remittances in 2004 (World Bank 2005). An average amount of remittances received by 
households during the year prior to the survey amounted to about NPR 24,000, or 16 
percent of mean household yearly consumption. Almost all (97 percent) of Nepali 
migrants are males, age 15 to 44, and the majority of migrants are either husbands or sons 
of household members receiving the remittances3. Most of the migrants come from rural 
areas. Only 13 percent of households based in the capital city of Katmandu have working 
migrants; the proportion of such households in rural areas of Nepal is twice as high. The 
propensity to migrate is higher among members of large households4. The proportion of 
households with migrants is the lowest among households of Newar and Janajati castes. 
On average, the amount of remittances received by households in Katmandu and other 
urban areas is double the amount received by rural households in Nepal. 
The formal sector in Nepal accounts for less than 8 percent of total female 
employment. Over 70 percent of women workers are self-employed or confined to low-
wage activities in the informal sector. In the urban areas, women are employed in a range 
of cottage industries such as carpet-weaving, textiles and handicrafts, as well as in 
occupations like vending, petty trade, brewing, and vegetable selling (UNDP 2004). In 
rural Nepal, women often work as hired agricultural labor or manual labor in construction 
                                                 
3 The Nepal Foreign Employment Act of 1985 placed some restrictions on foreign work migration by 
women. It limited the overseas travel of single women and women under 35 years of age. The Act prohibits 
the foreign employment of women without special permission from the Government (Sanghera and Kapur 
2000). 
4 All variables constructed using the household size for households with migrants are adjusted for the 
presence of would-be-migrants. 
 6
and forestry enterprises (Koolwal 2007). Women in Nepal lag far behind men in literacy 
rates and educational attainments: the gap between male and female literacy rates is about 
28 percentage points and males receive almost twice as many years of schooling as 
females (World Bank 2005).  
Figure 1 shows the age-gender pyramid for the Nepali population with 
superimposed proportions of individuals participating in the labor market. The pyramid 
shows that for ages 15 to 35, the number of females substantially exceeds the number of 
males. While multiple forces could be at play, work-related migration of males is clearly 
one of the strongest factors that influence this distribution. On average, 55 percent of 
adult males and 19 percent of females were engaged in market wage-earning activities in 
2004. The largest proportion of workers was among respondents 20 to 35 years of age, 
with 58 percent being male and 22 percent female. Participation in market work by both 
genders declined with age.  
 The levels of market work participation (MWP) by prime-age females were 
different depending on whether the households they lived in had migrant members and 
received remittances or not. Figure 2 shows the estimated distribution of MWP by 
percentiles of per capita expenditure, net of women’s market wages and by women’s 
levels of education. On average, only 13 percent of women from households with 
migrants participated in the labor market compared with 21 percent of women who lived 
in households with no migrants. The gap in the level of MWP between these two groups 
was widening for households from the top percentiles of expenditure distribution. The 
right panel of Figure 2 shows the female rates of MWP by years of education. Better-
educated women had a higher propensity to work. For all educational categories, except 
the highest, women from non-migrant households participated in the labor market at 
higher rates. MWP was least for women with only one to seven years of schooling.  
 
4. Theoretical Framework and Empirical Strategy 
 
In Nepal, work-related migration by a household member has to be planned ahead. 
Before migration takes place, multiple arrangements need to be made. For example, if 
traveling abroad, a migrant has to obtain an international passport, apply for a visa and 
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purchase a ticket. Thus, the decision to migrate for work and the actual event of 
migration taking place are separated in time. Once the decision is made, reversing it can 
often be costly for the household. The costs could come from fees to the migration 
broker, travel costs, a fixed contractual agreement between the migrant and the hiring 
agency, etc. (Bhattarai 2005). Therefore, usually, the worker has to migrate as planned, 
stay in the host country, and work. The decision taken by the household regarding 
migration, as well as the decision about the labor force participation of its members, can 
be modeled in a two-period optimization framework. 
Consider a unitary model of a household composed of two spouses, with a utility 
function U(C, Lm, Lf, X), where Lm and Lf are the leisure time of the husband and the wife 
respectively, and X is a vector of household characteristics. The household consumption 
C consists of goods purchased on the market and produced at home. The time available to 
spouses could be allocated to leisure, market work of a husband  at wage rate wm, 
market work of a wife 
m
mh
m
fh  at wage rate wf, and the time spent on home production  and 
d
mh
d
fh . The technology of home production is described by a continuous, twice-
differentiable function ( , )d dm ff h h  such that , and . 0
'
2,1 >f 0''2,1 <f
Let us assume, because of specialization, the husband is more productive in the 
labor market and the wife has higher productivity at home. Assume also that the husband 
can migrate and earn wage rate . Under these assumptions, the husband always 
works in the market  (either in the native or host country), while the wife 
allocates her time between leisure, home production and market work ( )
*
mw w>
0dmh ≥
m
                                                
0,mmh >
0, 0m df fh h≥ >
' 0zP <
5. 
Let z define a set of regional factors affecting the costs of migration P(z) ( ). 
In time period 1, the household decides whether the husband should migrate or 
not. The household compares his utilities with and without migration, conditional on the 
expected distribution of wages in period 2 (the actual wages in period 2 are unknown in 
period 1). The expected values of indirect utility functions in period 2 could be expressed 
as: 
 
5 Nepali men migrate both within the country and abroad in search of work. To keep things simple, from 
now on, we will refer to the destination of migration as a host country or abroad.  
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1 1 *
0 0
: ( ) ( ( , , , ( )))
: ( ) ( ( , , , ))
m f
m f
Migration E V E V w w X I P z
No migration E V E V w w X I
= −
=     (1) 
where superscript 1 corresponds to a regime in which the husband migrates and 0 to a 
regime where the husband stays at home. The household sends the migrant if 
E(V1)>E(V0). 
In period 2, the household observes the realized labor market outcomes: the 
migrant, who is by now in the host country, informs the household about his wages, and 
conditions on the local market become known. With this information, the household 
decides about the market participation of the wife. The household optimization process 
can be expressed as utility maximization in two regimes, with and without migration: 
{ , , , , , , } { , , , }
*
Husband stays home Husband migrates
( , , , ) ( , , , )
. . ( , ) . . (0, )
1; 1 1
m m d d m d
m f m f m f f f f
m f m fC L L h h h h C L h h
m m d d m m d
m m f f m f m m f f f
m d m d m d
m m m f f f f f f
MaxU C L L X MaxU C L L X
s t C w h w h f h h I s t C w h w h f h I
h h L h h L h h L
≤ + + + ≤ + + +
+ + = + + = + + =
     (2) 
Assuming that market wage is determined by an exogenous return r on the human capital 
characteristics, such that , we can derive, using Roy’s Identity, demand 
functions for the hours the woman supplies on the labor market in both regimes:  
( )w rf X=
( , , , ), 0,1s s h wH H X X X I s= =  (3) 
In each regime, the utility optimization problem has interior and corner solutions for the 
wife’s market hours. At the corner solution, the wife supplies zero hours on the market 
and spends her time on home production and leisure. At the interior solution, the wife 
allocates her time for market work, home production and leisure. 
Standard test-table hypotheses can be derived from the comparative static of (1-
2). The model predicts that a reduction in the cost of migration, P, and higher expected 
returns from migration, , increase the probability of the household choosing to send 
the migrant. In both regimes, the market hours of the wife are a decreasing function of the 
household’s non-labor income (which might include remittances); the effect of the wife’s 
wages on market hours is undefined. The effect of the husband’s migration on the wife’s 
labor market behavior is determined by the interaction of income effects and the effect of 
the changes in the wife’s productivity at home caused by the migration of her husband. 
*
mw
 9
Higher wages received by the husband in the host country, which are transferred to his 
household in the form of remittances, induce his wife to consume more leisure. If the 
inputs of spouses in home production are complements ( ), the migration of the 
husband ( ) would decrease his wife’s productivity at home
''
12 0f >
0=dhh 6. In that case, the total 
effect of migration on female MWP would be ambiguous: while some women would 
enter the labor market and women who worked before their husbands migrated would 
work more hours, others would just enjoy more leisure. If, however, the inputs of the 
husband and wife are substitutes ( ''12 0f < ), which is probably more likely in Nepal where 
a large share of household production is concentrated on work in subsistence agriculture 
(Kniesner 1976, Leeds and Allmen 2004), the migration of the husband would make the 
wife’s work at home more valuable and she would reduce her time on the market (Paris, 
Singh, Luis, and Hossain 2005). Some women would withdraw completely from market 
work. In that case, we would expect to observe lower levels of MWP among women 
living in sending households.  
  
Empirical specification 
 
Our theoretical model motivates the empirical estimation strategy. Let the market wage 
of a husband, wh, and a wife, ww, be determined as a linear combination of their 
productive characteristics. From (1), the reduced linearized form of the latent differential 
of indirect utility functions for migration and no-migration is: 
*D V1 0 1 1 0[ ] [ ]i i i i i i iV Z Z0 iZ iγ γ μ μ γ μ= − = − = +     (4) − +
|where γ is a vector of parameters, μi is an error term such that (0,1)i iZ Nμ   , and vector 
Zi includes variables on the productive characteristics of a husband and a wife, household 
characteristics, characteristics of the local labor market, and the variables determining 
cost of migration. Then the observed migration status of a husband Mi in period 1 can be 
expressed as7: 
                                                 
6 We assume that hiring perfect substitutes for the labor of family members who migrate might be very 
costly to households (Pfeiffer and Taylor 2007). 
7 The existence of the regime switching point (D*=0) follows from Brouwer’s fixed-point theorem, given 
the boundedness conditions, as long as D* is continuous (e.g., Border 1985). 
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*1[ 0] 1( 0)i i i iM D Zγ μ= ≥ = + ≥     (5) 
where 1[.] is an indicator function. From (3), the number of hours a wife supplies on the 
market could be expressed in a linearized form as: 
; 0,ij j iw ijH X j 1β ν= + =     (6) 
where βj is a regime-specific vector of parameters, Xi is a vector of individual 
characteristics of a wife, household characteristics, and characteristics of locality, and νij 
are the regime-specific error terms, such that ( | , ) 0ij i iE v X M ≠ . Let the Wij be the 
observed market work status of a wife in period 2, such that: 
1[ 0] 1( 0); 0,1ij ij j iw ijW H X v jβ= ≥ = + ≥ =     (7) 
 We assume that the error terms 0 1( , , )i i iv vμ in (4) and (6) are jointly normally 
distributed with a zero-mean vector and covariance matrix: 
0 1
10
1
1
1
μ μρ ρ
ρ
⎛ ⎞⎜ ⎟Σ = ⎜ ⎟⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠
,    (8) 
where ρμ0,1 are the correlations between μ and ν0, and ν1, and ρ01 is a correlation between 
ν0 and ν1. Since Wi1 and Wi0 are never observed simultaneously, the joint distribution of 
is not identified and, consequently, ρ10 cannot be estimated. Then, the log-
likelihood function for the simultaneous system of equations (5 and 7) is: 
0 1( , )i iv v
{ } { }
{ } { }
2 1 1 2 1 1
0, 0 0, 0
2 2 0 2 2 0
0, 0 0, 0
( ) ln ( , , ) ln ( , , )
ln ( , , ) ln ( , , )
j j j j
j j j j
j j j j
M W M W
j j j j
M W M W
Ln x z x z
x z x z
μ μ
μ μ
β γ ρ β γ ρ
β γ ρ β γ ρ
≠ ≠ ≠ =
= ≠ = =
ℑ = Φ + Φ − − +
Φ − − + Φ − −
∑ ∑
∑ ∑     (9) 
where Φ2 is the cumulative function of a bivariate normal distribution.  
This switching probit model (e.g., Carrasco 2001, Cappellari 2002) can be used to 
generate the counterfactual probabilities for women in different regimes of migration and 
market work participation. We define the impact of migration on the level of women’s 
MWP as a treatment effect, following the methodological framework developed by 
Aakvik, Heckman, and Vytlacil (2000). Then, the effect of migration on working women 
in sending households can be interpreted as the effect of treatment on the treated (ATT):  
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1 0
2 1 1 2 2 0
2
( ) Pr[ 1 | 1, ] Pr[ 1 | 1, ]
[ , , ] [ ' , , ]
[ ]
ATT x W M X x W M X x
x z x z
z
μ μβ γ ρ β γ ρ
γ
= = = = − = = =
Φ −Φ= Φ
,   (10) 
where x’ indicates that the household characteristics are adjusted for the presence of 
would-be-migrants in the counterfactual scenario of no migration. The ATT is the 
difference between the predicted probability of MWP for a woman currently residing in a 
household with a migrant and the probability for that woman working had the household 
decided not to send a migrant.   
 The effect of male migration on the probability of working by a woman randomly 
selected from the population can be expressed as the average treatment effect (ATE): 
1( ) Pr[ 1 | ] Pr[ 0 | ] [ ] [ATE x W X x W X x x x 2 ]β β= = = − = = = Φ −Φ     (11) 
The effect of male migration on female MWP can vary for households with different 
observed (X) and unobserved (μ) characteristics. To account for the unobserved 
heterogeneity we estimated the Marginal Treatment Effect (MTE) – the framework 
introduced by Bjorklund and Moffit (1987) and developed by Heckman and Vytlacil 
(1999, 2000, 2001, and 2005). The MTE identifies the effect of male migration on 
households induced to change the working status of their females because of migration. 
The MTE can be expressed as: 
1 0
1 1 2 0
2 2
1 0
( , ) Pr[ 1 | , ] Pr[ 1 | , ]
1 1
MTE x W X x W X x
x xμ μ
μ μ
μ μ μ μ μ
β ρ μ β ρ μ
ρ ρ
= = = = − = = =
⎡ ⎤ ⎡ ⎤+ +⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥= Φ −Φ⎢ ⎥ ⎢ ⎥− −⎣ ⎦ ⎣ ⎦
    (12) 
The schematic diagram of the switching probit model of male migration and female 
market work participation is shown in Figure 3. 
 
Identification strategy 
 
The system of equations (5) and (7) is identified by non-linearities even if variables in X 
and Z overlap completely. To improve the efficiency and computational stability of the 
estimates, we imposed stronger identification restrictions on the model by including 
variables that, we believe, influence the household’s migration decision but have no 
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direct impact on the MWP decision. Causal effects of migration could be identified by a 
variation in the instrumental variables since the effect of this variation is entirely 
channeled through the household’s migration decision. We used information from the 
2001 Nepal Census Data (Central Bureau of Statistics 2003) to construct two 
instrumental variables: the proportion of internal and abroad migrants in a ward (village) 
in 2001. We argued that the women’s decisions to participate in market work in 2004 
should not be directly affected by the extent of migration networks in 2001, after 
controlling for the then current conditions on the local labor market. Studies of the Nepali 
labor market indicate that female and male labor markets are segmented and the rates of 
female paid employment are only marginally affected by changes in labor market 
conditions for males (Acharya 2003, Bhatt and Bhattarai 2006). 
The proportion of migrants in a ward in 2001 could be interpreted as a proxy for 
the ward-level networks that help future migrants to migrate (e.g., Carringon, 
Detragiache, and Vishwanath 1996; Munshi 2003). When in the host country, Nepali 
migrants develop extensive social and information networks that link them with relatives 
and friends in the home country (Yamanaka 2000). Such networks lower the cost of 
migration for the population of a ward. Indeed, in Nepal, migrants tend to follow their co-
villagers and migrate to the same destinations (Thieme 2006). They also are likely to fill 
a similar niche in the labor market. The identification strategies that use migrant networks 
as instruments for migration decisions were applied by Woodraff and Zenteno (2001) and 
McKenzie and Rapoport (2005) in studies of migration in Mexico.  
Explanatory variables 
 
Our theoretical model guided us on selecting the explanatory variables for the empirical 
specification. Conceptually, these variables can be grouped into four categories. The first 
group of variables contains those characteristics of a woman that determine her market 
productivity: her age (experience) and educational level dummies. The second group 
includes variables that could affect the home productivity of household members. Among 
such variables are household demographic composition and the size of the land plot 
owned by the household. The third group includes variables describing ethnicity, religion 
and household non-wage income. The household non-wage income is a sum of all 
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government and private transfers--such as pensions, scholarships and stipends--that could 
be considered exogenous to the household migration or labor force participation 
decisions. Finally, a set of variables describing the regional and ward characteristics 
includes variables reflecting labor market conditions in a ward.  
The descriptive statistics for the main explanatory variables used in our analysis 
are reported in Table 1. The characteristics of women living in migrant sending and non-
sending households are similar. Among the differences, women residing in non-sending 
households seem to be better educated. Migrant sending households are, on average, 
smaller, have a higher share of adult males (adjusted for the number of current migrants), 
possess larger land plots, and have higher non-wage incomes. The comparison of 
characteristics of women who participate in the labor market with non-working women 
demonstrates that working women are better educated, less likely to be married, and 
reside in smaller households and in households with a smaller proportion of adult women. 
Brahmin, Chhetri and Newar households are less likely to have their women working on 
the market compared with other castes. Land ownership has a strong negative effect on 
the probability of women participating in the labor market: women living in landless 
households are almost three times as likely to work for wages compared with women 
from households with less than one hectare of land. The gap between these women and 
the number of working women belonging to households that own larger land plots is even 
greater. Women living in Katmandu and other urban areas of Nepal are more likely to 
work for wages than women from rural Nepal. 
 
5. Results 
 
The results of the joint estimation of equations (5) and (7) are shown in Table 28. The 
coefficients on the main explanatory variables affecting household migration and 
                                                 
8 According to the likelihood-ratio test criterion, the specification that assumes an independence of the error 
terms in equations 5 and 7 (Table A1 in Appendix) is rejected in favor of the SPFIML estimation. The 
results of estimation of equations 5 and 7, under assumption of independence of the error terms between 
these two systems, are shown in Appendix.  
The Wald tests show that the estimated ρμ0 is statistically significant with (χ2(1)=4.03) and ρμ0 is 
statistically significant with (χ2(1)=3.88); two ρ’s are jointly significant. The Wald test also rejects the 
hypothesis that 1 0[ , ] 0Cov v vμ − = .   
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woman’s market work participation decisions correspond well with the predictions of our 
theoretical model. Households in wards with a higher proportion of migrants in 2001 
were more likely to send their male members to work. 
Overall, the observed household characteristics, in particular geographical and 
ward characteristics, play a more important role in determining the level of MWP by 
women in non-migrant sending households compared with women residing in migrant 
sending households. While a household’s human and productive capital have a strong 
effect on women’s MWP in households without migrants, these factors become less 
important for households that have sent migrants--where remittances contribute a 
significant share to the household budget. 
The level of MWP increases with age for women living in both sending and non-
sending households. Married women and women with 11 or more years of education are 
more likely to work for wages. Household non-wage income negatively affects the 
likelihood of market employment of women from non-sending households. The effect of 
non-wage income on MWP of women living in sending households is insignificant. 
Household composition seems to affect the MWP of women in non-sending households. 
Relative to other ethnic groups, Dalit and Muslim households have a higher probability of 
their women working. These results are consistent with the findings of other studies 
which demonstrate that women from Indo-Aryan communities that follow Hinduism and 
are disposed toward patriarchy are less likely to work for pay. At the same time, primary 
Buddhists, Tibeto-Burman and Muslim communities offer much greater social and 
economic mobility to their women (Raghuram 2001, Koolwal 2007). Households with 
large land plots are less likely to have their female members working outside the home, 
regardless of whether male household members migrate or not. This can be attributed to 
the economies of scale in agricultural home production which increase women’s 
productivity when they work on larger land plots. Compared with women living in 
Katmandu, women residing in other urban areas of Nepal and in Rural Western Terai 
have a lower propensity to participate in market work.  
Finally, certain local conditions are significantly correlated with levels of female 
MWP. Women from non-migrant sending households, living in wards with a high 
proportion of illiteracy, are significantly less likely to work on the market compared with 
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women in wards with better-educated populations. Higher shares of wage- and self-
employed in wards have a positive impact on MWP by women from households with no 
migrants in these wards. The effects of local labor market conditions on the MWP of 
women residing in migrant sending households are insignificant. 
To ascertain the validity of our instruments, we conducted a range of diagnostic 
tests. The Sargan’s test (Sargan 1958) did not reject (Prob> χ2(1)=0.353) the null 
hypothesis that the excluded instruments are uncorrelated with the error terms and 
correctly excluded from the estimated equation. We investigated the potential problem of 
having weak instruments by adopting the test by Stock and Yogo (2005). We calculated 
the value of Cragg-Donald (CD) Wald F statistic by regressing a woman’s MWP on a set 
of her characteristics, an instrumental variable, and an endogenous dummy for having a 
migrant from the household. The hypothesis of weak instruments was rejected with the 
CD F statistic of 20.39, and the critical values of Stock-Yogo test of 19.93 for 10 percent 
size of the Wald test.  
 
Simulations 
 
We simulated the impact of male migration on women’s MWP according to (10). Women 
living in migrant sending households had 5.4 percentage points (bootstrap standard error 
of 1.3)9 or about 40 percent lower probability of participating in market work compared 
with the counterfactual scenario of women living in non-sending households–this is the 
ATT effect. The specification where the migration dummy was included directly into the 
MWP equation (the un-instrumented probit estimates shown in Table A2 in the 
Appendix) resulted in ATT of –5.6 percentage points (bootstrap standard error of 1.8). 
The magnitude of these effects is similar to those found by Kim (2007) in Jamaica. At the 
same time, the effect of male work-related migration on the MWP of a woman randomly 
selected from the population (ATE) was positive and statistically not different from zero. 
In comparison, the raw difference in rates of MWP was –8.4 (standard error of 1.1) 
                                                 
9  The simulated probabilities are generated for each household by integrating over the estimated 
heterogeneity distribution and averaging the probabilities across the sample. The standard errors of the 
predicted probabilities are calculated by bootstrapping. 
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( , suggesting that controlling for selection 
appeared to be important in these data.  
1 0Prob( | 1) Prob( | 0) 8.4))W M W M= − = = −
We can also simulate the heterogeneity of the effect of male migration on female 
MWP by observable characteristics. These simulations are shown in the first column of 
Table 3. The largest negative impact of male migration is registered for women 25 to 35 
years of age whose level of MWP would increase by 6.9 percentage points if male 
migrants were to stay at home. The detrimental effect of male migration on female MWP 
increases with the number of years of a woman’s education. The rate of MWP by women 
with 11 or more years of schooling is 15.4 percentage points lower than it would be in the 
counterfactual scenario. The work patterns of women residing in Katmandu and other 
urban areas of Nepal, as well as those of women living in landless households, are 
affected by male migration to a greater degree than those of women living in households 
with large land-holdings and in rural areas. We can speculate that such differences could 
be explained by the differences in the technology of home production. In households with 
large land plots, women might be able to substitute, to some extent, the inputs of now 
migrant male labor by hired labor, thus lowering the impact of male migration on their 
productivity at home. The home production of landless households is likely to be related 
to child rearing and tending for elderly household members--activities for which finding a 
paid substitute is difficult. 
The heterogeneity of the effect of migration by unobservable characteristics can 
be investigated using the MTE framework. Figure 4 plots the MTE against the 
normalized values of unobservables (μ) at the population means for X’s according to 
(12). The estimate of MTE is monotonically decreasing in μ, indicating that households 
that are more likely to send one of their male members to work are also more likely to 
withdraw their female members from the labor market. The fact that the MTE is not flat 
confirms the presence of unobserved heterogeneity in the impact of migration on 
women’s MWP.  
The estimated correlations of error terms in (4) and (6) demonstrate the perverse 
selection on unobservables: for households sending migrants, unobservables that 
positively affect the probability of sending a migrant for work have a negative impact on 
the probability of a woman to participate in the labor market ( 1( , ) 0.290Corr vμ = − ). At 
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the same time, for households with no migrants, the unobservables promoting migration 
are positively correlated with woman’s employment ( 0( , ) 0.256Corr vμ = ). Thus, higher 
values of μ are correlated with lower value of ν1 and with higher values of ν0, so that the 
impact of migration on labor force participation of women is lower for the households 
with high μ (who are more likely to have a working migrant).  
There are several qualifications to and possible caveats in our results. First, our 
results are obtained using the 2004 cross-sectional data. Without panel data we have no 
instruments to control for possible household- or community-level endogeneity. In this 
sense, our estimations of the impact of work-related migration are valid only to the extent 
that unobserved family and community characteristics are captured by the variables 
included in our empirical specification. Second, while the majority of women in our 
sample are wives of migrants, some are daughters and other relatives of migrants. The 
effect of male migration might be different depending on whether the migrants are 
husbands, fathers, brothers or some other relative of the women in the sending 
households. Our analysis fails to capture this heterogeneity. Finally, we focus only on the 
direct impact of male migration for work on the labor market behavior of women in 
sending households. At the same time, male migration for work may also affect the 
aggregate labor market conditions in the sending communities. Accounting for the 
general equilibrium consequences of work-related migration might reduce its estimated 
impact on the MWP of females left behind. 
 
6. Conclusions 
 
This paper examines the extent to which male migration for work affects labor force 
participation by prime age females in Nepal. The theoretical model developed in this 
paper predicts that male migration for work might have two main effects on the MWP of 
the women in the sending households. First, the increase in household income due to 
remittances from the migrants might lead to a reduction in the rates of MWP by the 
women. Second, depending on the properties of the home production function, male 
migration can increase or decrease women’s productivity at home, thus having an 
ambiguous effect on their MWP. The overall effect of male migration on women’s MWP 
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depends on the interaction of these factors. We tested this relationship using data from a 
nationally-representative household survey for Nepal. We compared the observed rates of 
MWP of women living in households that had sent migrants with the rates simulated 
under a counterfactual scenario of no migration. To construct these counterfactuals we 
estimated a model of household male migration and female MWP decisions, identifying 
observed and unobserved differences in the returns to characteristics based on migration 
status.  
The results of our simulations show that the migration of male household 
members reduces women’s rates of MWP by 5.4 percentage points. The effect of male 
migration is strongest for women 25 to 35 years of age and for women with 11 or more 
years of education. The income effect of remittances from migrants and the 
substitutability of male and female time inputs in home production might explain the 
stronger impact of male migration on the MWP of women residing in landless 
households and in urban areas of Nepal. The MWP of women living in households with 
large landholdings is affected by male migration to a lesser degree, suggesting that in 
such households, males and females might complement each other in home production. 
We find evidence of substantial heterogeneity (based both on observable and 
unobservable characteristics) in the impact of male migration.  
Work-related migration is already high in Nepal and will most likely continue 
rising in response to the economic incentives offered by neighboring countries. Our 
findings highlight the gender dimension of the impact of predominantly male work 
migration on the wellbeing of sending households. The effect of male migration on the 
work pattern of women left behind has important implications for the latter’s overall 
social status and might influence the outcomes of other household members, particularly 
children. Hence, strategies for economic development in Nepal should take into account 
such gender aspects of the migration dynamics.  
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Table 1: Descriptive statistics for the main variables  
 
Women from 
households  
with migrants 
Women from 
households  
with no migrants
Women working 
on the market  
 
Women who do 
not work on the 
market 
 Mean
Std. 
 Error Mean
Std. 
Error Mean
Std. 
 Error Mean 
Std. 
Error 
Participate in wage work 0.127 0.008 0.211 0.007     
Live in household with migrants   0.214 0.412 0.335 0.472 
Age 34.542 12.825 34.521 11.799 34.045 10.565 34.637 12.453 
Married 0.806 0.010 0.812 0.006 0.782 0.013 0.817 0.006 
Illiterate 0.614 0.012 0.612 0.008 0.537 0.016 0.630 0.007 
1-4 years of schooling 0.100 0.007 0.102 0.005 0.109 0.010 0.100 0.005 
5-7 years of schooling 0.099 0.007 0.084 0.005 0.090 0.009 0.089 0.004 
8-10 years of schooling 0.152 0.009 0.135 0.006 0.159 0.012 0.136 0.005 
11+ years of schooling 0.035 0.004 0.066 0.004 0.106 0.010 0.045 0.003 
Household nonwage income 0.609 4.585 0.508 3.065 0.305 1.708 0.593 3.912 
Household size 5.835 2.952 6.267 3.189 5.536 2.537 6.268 3.226 
Share of adult men 0.325 0.003 0.277 0.002 0.282 0.005 0.294 0.002 
Share of elderly 0.320 0.003 0.337 0.002 0.347 0.005 0.328 0.002 
Share of women 0.152 0.003 0.157 0.003 0.137 0.005 0.160 0.002 
Share of children 0-6 0.165 0.004 0.192 0.003 0.199 0.006 0.180 0.003 
Share of children 7-15 0.033 0.002 0.036 0.001 0.033 0.003 0.036 0.001 
Male headed household  0.643 0.012 0.903 0.005 0.779 0.013 0.831 0.006 
Brahman/Chhetri 0.355 0.012 0.285 0.007 0.212 0.013 0.329 0.007 
Dalits 0.084 0.007 0.068 0.004 0.074 0.008 0.072 0.004 
Newars 0.065 0.006 0.150 0.006 0.233 0.013 0.098 0.004 
TeraiMC 0.255 0.011 0.247 0.007 0.210 0.013 0.259 0.007 
Muslims, other  0.241 0.010 0.250 0.007 0.271 0.014 0.242 0.006 
Hindu household  0.829 0.009 0.817 0.006 0.808 0.012 0.824 0.006 
Landless households  0.372 0.012 0.471 0.008 0.694 0.015 0.383 0.007 
Own less than 1 ha of land 0.377 0.012 0.314 0.008 0.234 0.013 0.357 0.007 
Own 1ha to 2 ha of land 0.159 0.009 0.141 0.006 0.050 0.007 0.169 0.006 
Own more than 2 ha of land 0.091 0.007 0.073 0.004 0.022 0.005 0.092 0.004 
Katmandu 0.038 0.007 0.144 0.004 0.226 0.005 0.082 0.004 
Other urban areas 0.185 0.009 0.187 0.006 0.221 0.013 0.178 0.006 
Rural Western Hills 0.239 0.010 0.150 0.006 0.097 0.009 0.196 0.006 
Rural Eastern Hills 0.169 0.009 0.193 0.006 0.148 0.011 0.194 0.006 
Rural Western Terai 0.117 0.008 0.118 0.005 0.064 0.008 0.130 0.005 
Rural Eastern Terai 0.250 0.011 0.208 0.007 0.244 0.014 0.216 0.006 
Percent of migrant population 0.139 0.004 0.091 0.002 0.091 0.004 0.109 0.002 
Number of observations 1,694 3,732 1,004 4,422 
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Table 2: FIML Estimation of the Endogenous Switching Probit Model 
 MWP equation. Households  
 with no migrant with migrant Migration decision  
 Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err 
Age 0.064*** 0.017 0.110*** 0.031 -0.042*** 0.013 
Age squared/100 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.002*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 
Married -0.090 0.080 -0.365*** 0.135 0.202*** 0.064 
Educational category (reference: Illiterate)     
1-4 years of schooling 0.112 0.085 -0.292* 0.172 0.004 0.071 
5-7 years of schooling 0.019 0.094 0.077 0.167 0.071 0.075 
8-10 years of schooling 0.076 0.085 0.026 0.163 0.153** 0.072 
11+ years of schooling 0.327*** 0.119 0.818*** 0.263 0.032 0.120 
Currently in school -0.435*** 0.142 -0.793*** 0.304 0.032 0.119 
Household characteristics        
Household non-wage income -0.052*** 0.014 -0.014 0.015 0.002 0.005 
Household size  0.007 0.029 0.072 0.083 -0.082*** 0.022 
Household size squared -0.000 0.001 -0.004 0.005 0.002** 0.001 
Share of adult men 0.109 0.327 -0.684 0.790 -1.042*** 0.256 
Share of elderly 1.672*** 0.429 0.753 1.667 -4.700*** 0.244 
Share of women 0.466 0.299 -0.143 0.907 -2.505*** 0.186 
Share of children 0-6 1.088*** 0.265 -0.001 0.895 -2.453*** 0.172 
Share of children 7-15 0.059 0.169 0.068 0.482 -1.466*** 0.059 
Male-headed household  -0.239** 0.094 -0.424 0.269 0.685*** 0.067 
Ethnicity (reference:Brahman/Chhetri)     
Dalits 0.223** 0.108 0.424** 0.166 -0.090 0.083 
Newars 0.477*** 0.088 0.497*** 0.184 -0.259*** 0.085 
TeraiMC 0.402*** 0.080 0.197 0.138 -0.108* 0.059 
Muslims, other  0.261*** 0.081 0.361** 0.141 -0.122** 0.062 
Hindu households  0.022 0.069 0.253* 0.133 -0.106* 0.058 
Land ownership (reference: Landless households)      
Own less than 1 ha of land -0.429*** 0.079 -0.685*** 0.124 0.024 0.065 
Own 1 ha to 2 ha of land -0.832*** 0.111 -1.114*** 0.195 0.002 0.078 
Own more than 2 ha of land -1.106*** 0.155 -0.869*** 0.219 0.196** 0.093 
Regional Dummies (reference: Kathmandu)     
Other urban areas -0.135 0.101 0.062 0.357 0.748*** 0.101 
Rural Western Hills -0.060 0.149 0.487 0.451 0.778*** 0.132 
Rural Eastern Hills 0.359*** 0.138 0.865** 0.376 0.579*** 0.129 
Rural Western Terai 0.074 0.147 0.669* 0.406 0.716*** 0.128 
Rural Eastern Terai 0.498*** 0.148 0.899** 0.451 0.927*** 0.121 
Ward characteristics        
 Percent of illiterate -1.164*** 0.175 -0.807*** 0.284 0.182 0.131 
 Percent of wage employment  1.629*** 0.306 0.431 0.517 0.153 0.241 
 Percent of self-employed 0.548** 0.218 -0.082 0.350 0.416*** 0.149 
Percent of abroad migrants     0.887*** 0.152 
Percent of domestic migrants      0.260 0.231 
Constant -2.776*** 0.518 -2.940*** 0.768 2.660*** 0.316 
Number of observations     
Log-likelihood 
5,426 
-4855.13     
Note: * is significant at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level. The standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level. 
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Table 3: Simulated Effect of Migration on Level of MWP of Women in Migrant Sending 
Households (by characteristics of women and household characteristics)  
 (ATT) (ATE) 
Age category   
  18-25 -5.303 0.815 
  25-35 -6.874 -0.767 
  35-45 -3.548 2.020 
  45-60 -1.670 1.551 
Education category   
  Illiterate  -3.915 0.918 
  1-4 years of schooling -7.798 -6.307 
  5-7 years of schooling -6.120 0.915 
  8-10 years of schooling -7.834 -0.995 
  11+ years of schooling -15.410 7.834 
Regions   
  Katmandu -18.129 -6.942 
  Other urban areas -9.405 0.787 
  Rural Western Hills -0.898 1.402 
  Rural Eastern Hills -6.001 -0.535 
  Rural Western Terai -1.684 2.776 
  Rural Eastern Terai -5.294 2.053 
Ethnicity   
  Brahman/Chhetri -2.787 1.291 
  Dalit -1.360 0.724 
  Newars -1.706 4.622 
  TeraiMC -9.956 -3.072 
  Muslim, other  -5.876 1.754 
Landholding   
  Landless households  -9.545 0.554 
  Own less than 1 ha of land -3.561 -0.363 
  Own 1 ha to 2 ha of land -3.088 -0.345 
  Own more than 2 ha of land -1.790 2.967 
Total -5.44 -0.03 
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Figure 1: Age-gender Population Pyramid with Superimposed Rates of MWP for Males 
and Females. Nepal 2004. 
 26
Mean
.05
.1
.2
.3
.21
.13
R
at
e 
of
 fe
m
al
e 
m
ar
ke
t w
or
k 
pa
rti
ci
pa
tio
n 
(%
)
0 20 40 60 80 100
Percentiles of per capita expenditure net of woman's wage
Lives in a hh with no migrants
Lives in a hh with migrants
95% confidence interval
.05
.1
.2
.3
.4
 
Illiterate 1-4 5-7 8-10 11+
Level of Education, years
Lives in a hh with no migrants
Lives in a hh with migrants
 
 
Figure 2: Rates of MWP (by Percentiles of Per Capita Expenditure (Lowess Regression) 
and Years of Education) by Females in Households With and Without Work Migrants. 
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Figure 3: Sample Selection Diagram, number of observations and percent of the sample 
in corresponding group. 
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Figure 4: Estimated Marginal Treatment Effect at Population Means 
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Appendix 
 
Table A1: Estimation of system (5-7) under an assumption of independence of the error 
terms: three independent probits. 
 MWP equation MWP equation Migration decision  
 Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err 
Age 0.107*** 0.030 0.058*** 0.017 -0.042*** 0.013 
Age squared/100 -0.148*** 0.040 -0.086*** 0.023 0.054*** 0.017 
Married -0.352*** 0.127 -0.057 0.082 0.194*** 0.064 
Educational category (reference: Illiterate)     
1-4 years of schooling -0.292* 0.172 0.120 0.087 0.010 0.071 
5-7 years of schooling 0.083 0.165 0.037 0.097 0.066 0.075 
8-10 years of schooling 0.040 0.152 0.101 0.087 0.137* 0.072 
11+ years of schooling 0.826*** 0.259 0.347*** 0.121 0.016 0.121 
Currently in school -0.794*** 0.304 -0.445*** 0.145 0.022 0.119 
Household characteristics        
Household non-wage income -0.013 0.015 -0.052*** 0.014 0.002 0.005 
Household size  0.065 0.079 -0.001 0.030 -0.081*** 0.022 
Household size squared -0.004 0.005 -0.000 0.001 0.002** 0.001 
Share of adult men -0.781 0.674 -0.112 0.321 -1.062*** 0.256 
Share of elderly 0.360 0.465 0.923*** 0.309 -4.708*** 0.242 
Share of women -0.334 0.440 0.009 0.234 -2.518*** 0.186 
Share of children 0-6 -0.193 0.411 0.669*** 0.212 -2.445*** 0.171 
Share of children 7-15 -0.046 0.109 -0.253*** 0.087 -1.471*** 0.059 
Male-headed households  -0.367** 0.145 -0.137 0.087 0.690*** 0.067 
Ethnicity (reference: Brahman/Chhetri)     
Dalit 0.423** 0.166 0.213* 0.112 -0.090 0.083 
Newars 0.476*** 0.170 0.448*** 0.090 -0.273*** 0.085 
Terai Casts 0.190 0.136 0.397*** 0.082 -0.107* 0.059 
Muslim, other  0.351** 0.138 0.242*** 0.083 -0.126** 0.062 
Hindu households  0.246* 0.131 0.006 0.070 -0.102* 0.058 
Land ownership (reference: landless households)      
Own less than 1ha of land -0.686*** 0.123 -0.448*** 0.079 0.018 0.065 
Own 1 ha to 2 ha of land -1.117*** 0.193 -0.867*** 0.110 -0.001 0.078 
Own more than 2 ha of land -0.855*** 0.217 -1.112*** 0.159 0.192** 0.093 
Regional Dummies (reference: Kathmandu)     
Other urban areas 0.130 0.224 -0.035 0.094 0.735*** 0.101 
Rural Western Hills 0.571** 0.282 0.070 0.142 0.769*** 0.131 
Rural Eastern Hills 0.922*** 0.283 0.442*** 0.134 0.563*** 0.128 
Rural Western Terai 0.740*** 0.275 0.176 0.144 0.694*** 0.127 
Rural Eastern Terai 0.985*** 0.262 0.661*** 0.126 0.917*** 0.120 
Ward characteristics        
 Percent of illiterate -0.795*** 0.283 -1.186*** 0.178 0.180 0.131 
 Percent of wage employment  0.430 0.520 1.705*** 0.309 0.148 0.240 
 Percent of self-employed -0.051 0.328 0.653*** 0.218 0.413*** 0.150 
Percent of abroad migrants     0.845*** 0.150 
Percent of domestic migrants      0.224 0.232 
Constant -2.844*** 0.686 -1.986*** 0.425 2.713*** 0.314 
Number of observations 1,694 3,732 5,426 
Log-likelihood -537.69 -1,656.50 -2,662.73 
Note: * is significant at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level. 
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Table A2: Probit estimation of the model of female MWP with uninstrumented dummy 
for migration status. 
 Market Work Participation  
 Coefficient Std. Err 
Household with male migrant -0.251*** 0.056 
Age 0.070*** 0.015 
Age squared/100 -0.100*** 0.020 
Married -0.148** 0.068 
Educational category (reference: Illiterate)   
1-4 years of schooling 0.027 0.076 
5-7 years of schooling 0.048 0.083 
8-10 years of schooling 0.079 0.075 
11+ years of schooling 0.396*** 0.108 
Currently in school -0.493*** 0.129 
Household characteristics    
Household non-wage income -0.041*** 0.011 
Household size  0.002 0.026 
Household size squared -0.000 0.001 
Share of adult men -0.234 0.284 
Share of elderly 0.740*** 0.252 
Share of women -0.076 0.202 
Share of children 0-6 0.446** 0.184 
Share of children 7-15 -0.154** 0.065 
Male-headed household  -0.184** 0.073 
Ethnicity (reference: Brahman/Chhetri)   
Dalit 0.274*** 0.092 
Newar 0.453*** 0.078 
TeraiMC 0.323*** 0.069 
Muslim, other  0.271*** 0.070 
Hindu households  0.050 0.061 
Land ownership (reference: landless households)   
Own less than 1ha of land -0.520*** 0.066 
Own 1 ha to 2 ha of land -0.930*** 0.094 
Own more than 2 ha of land -1.009*** 0.125 
Regional Dummies (reference: Kathmandu)   
Other urban areas -0.071 0.084 
Rural Western Hills 0.151 0.122 
Rural Eastern Hills 0.507*** 0.118 
Rural Western Terai 0.267** 0.122 
Rural Eastern Terai 0.672*** 0.110 
Ward characteristics    
 Percent of illiterate -1.057*** 0.148 
 Percent of wage employment  1.314*** 0.261 
 Percent of self-employed 0.424** 0.179 
Constant -2.000*** 0.352 
Number of observations 5,426 
Log-likelihood -2,221.83 
Note: * is significant at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level. The standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level. 
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Table A3: FIML estimation of the endogenous switching probit model. Instruments 
included in all equations (no exclusion restrictions).  
 MWP equation. Households  
 with no migrant with migrant Migration decision  
 Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err Coeff. Std. Err 
Age 0.063*** 0.017 0.097*** 0.033 -0.042*** 0.013 
Age squared/100 -0.001*** 0.000 -0.001*** 0.000 0.001*** 0.000 
Married -0.083 0.083 -0.310** 0.136 0.195*** 0.064 
Educational category (reference: Illiterate)     
1-4 years of schooling 0.114 0.086 -0.298* 0.171 0.006 0.071 
5-7 years of schooling 0.026 0.096 0.094 0.164 0.068 0.075 
8-10 years of schooling 0.086 0.087 0.057 0.153 0.148** 0.072 
11+ years of schooling 0.343*** 0.121 0.809*** 0.257 0.024 0.121 
Currently in school -0.450*** 0.145 -0.771** 0.304 0.024 0.119 
Household characteristics        
Household non-wage income -0.053*** 0.014 -0.013 0.015 0.002 0.005 
Household size  0.003 0.030 0.049 0.081 -0.082*** 0.022 
Household size squared -0.000 0.001 -0.004 0.005 0.002** 0.001 
Share of adult men 0.016 0.344 -0.887 0.682 -1.063*** 0.256 
Share of elderly 1.416*** 0.522 -0.389 1.102 -4.719*** 0.243 
Share of women 0.315 0.349 -0.703 0.621 -2.519*** 0.185 
Share of children 0-6 0.937*** 0.316 -0.550 0.608 -2.463*** 0.172 
Share of children 7-15 -0.049 0.199 -0.264 0.296 -1.470*** 0.059 
Male-headed household  -0.207** 0.103 -0.247 0.219 0.690*** 0.067 
Ethnicity (reference: Brahman/Chhetri)     
Dalit 0.217* 0.111 0.383** 0.167 -0.092 0.083 
Newar 0.451*** 0.091 0.434** 0.187 -0.261*** 0.086 
TeraiMC 0.406*** 0.081 0.167 0.137 -0.109* 0.059 
Muslim, other  0.264*** 0.083 0.333** 0.143 -0.122** 0.062 
Hindu households  0.014 0.071 0.235* 0.133 -0.102* 0.058 
Land ownership (reference: landless households)      
Own less than 1ha of land -0.432*** 0.080 -0.670*** 0.128 0.019 0.065 
Own 1ha to 2 ha of land -0.846*** 0.111 -1.110*** 0.199 -0.001 0.078 
Own more than 2 ha of land -1.103*** 0.157 -0.820*** 0.233 0.189** 0.093 
Regional Dummies (reference: Kathmandu)     
Other urban areas -0.099 0.108 0.246 0.281 0.740*** 0.101 
Rural Western Hills -0.070 0.158 0.618* 0.323 0.780*** 0.132 
Rural Eastern Hills 0.415*** 0.144 1.015*** 0.294 0.577*** 0.129 
Rural Western Terai 0.094 0.153 0.851*** 0.303 0.710*** 0.128 
Rural Eastern Terai 0.556*** 0.157 1.136*** 0.305 0.925*** 0.121 
Ward characteristics        
 percent of illiterate -1.260*** 0.183 -0.748*** 0.290 0.188 0.131 
 percent of wage employment  1.738*** 0.314 0.539 0.517 0.143 0.241 
 percent of self-employed 0.612*** 0.225 0.008 0.336 0.409*** 0.150 
Percent of abroad migrants 0.383 0.257 0.536 0.342 0.844*** 0.150 
Percent of domestic migrants  0.632 0398 -0.117 0.525 0.194 0.233 
Constant -2.598*** 0.602 -2.621*** 0.768 2.701*** 0.316 
Number of observations     
Log-likelihood 
5,426 
-4850.94     
Note: * is significant at 10 percent level; ** at 5 percent level; *** at 1 percent level. The standard 
errors are adjusted for clustering on a ward level. 
  
